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 1 
Introduction 
25 years ago Justice Kennedy postulated that, “minds are not changed in streets and parks as 
they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping 
of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media.”2 Hundreds of millions even 
billions of users worldwide use platforms like Facebook and YouTube to communicate, share 
content, or even sell items for whatever purpose they see fit [albeit within limits determined by 
the platform].3 User content varies in complexity and can be as straightforward as, “I saw Tom 
Cruise at Trader Joe’s today” to something more complex e.g. critiquing the US immigration 
system by overlaying an image of caged immigrants with quotes from ‘The Irony of American 
History’ by Reinhold Niebuhr.4 User content can be nuanced and thereby makes content 
moderation difficult. Human content moderators spend an average of 10-15 seconds per image; 
however, it has been found that the time frame could be as short as 2 seconds per image.5 That 
said, due to incidents like the livestreaming of the Christchurch shootings on Facebook, 
lawmakers around the world began closely scrutinizing how these platforms moderate content 
i.e. the means and methods by which platforms monitor, filter, rank and block user generated 
content.6 This pressure has led to the need for automated moderation since human moderators 
generally cannot keep up with the content and usually have little training or support; 
nevertheless, machine assisted moderation has not reached the point where it can sufficiently 
                                                        
2  Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power over Online Speech, Hoover Working 
Group on National Security, Technology, and Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1902, (January 2019)(citing Denver 
Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 US 727, 802-3 (1996)(Kennedy, J., concurring)) 
[hereinafter Keller, (2019)] 
3 Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Research Serv., R45650, Free Speech and the Regulation of Social Media Content, 
(2019) [hereinafter Brannon (2019)] 
4 John C. Bennet, The Irony of American History 
work by Niebuhr, Encyclopedia Britannica (2020) https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Irony-of-American-
History 
5 Frederik Stjernfelt & Anne M. Lauritzen, Facebook’s Handbook of Content Removal. In: Your Post has been 
Removed, 134 (Springer, Cham., 2020) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25968-6_11 (noting that one 
Facebook moderator working 8 hours a day from 2008 to 2013, processed 15,000 images a day) [hereinafter 
Steirnfelt & Lauritzen (2020)] 
6  Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 53 Cornell Int'l L.J. 41, 42-3 (2020), [hereinafter Bloch-
Wehba (2020)]. 
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understand the contextual nuances of human languages.7 Throughout this article, the terms 
‘content moderation’ and [mandatory] takedowns will be mentioned but these are distinct 
notions. Content legality varies between countries and when a company is ordered to take 
content down, that is a mandatory takedown; however, removing content that is legal albeit 
undesirable (e.g. certain kinds of hate speech) to the internet service is an example of content 
moderation.8 Moderation standards vary between platforms but they generally rely on several 
of the same sources to identify content for removal: (1) users [to flag violating content]; (2) 
employed content moderators; and (3) AI (using machine learning to develop automated 
content filters).9 Few platforms rely on machine learning models to identify new content that 
could violate their terms and conditions, and most rely on models that have been trained to 
identify specific phrases and images.10 Facebook successfully used these models to tag 99% of 
violent and graphic content before users reported on it; however, with bullying and harassment 
content that success rate dropped to 16%, indicating that moderators are [for now] better suited 
to pick up on these types of violation.11 As discussed throughout this article, platforms have an 
economic incentive to remove offensive and illegal content, thus increasing their reliance on 
automated content filters.12 Due to this combination of economic and political pressure, content 
deemed as objectionable or harmful but not illegal under the platforms’ policies have been 
falsely removed.13 User generated content is also colored by societal norms, personal 
                                                        
7 Access Now, Protecting Free Expression in the Era of Online Content Moderation: Access Now’s preliminary 
recommendations on content moderation and Facebook’s planned oversight board, 5 (May 2019) 
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/05/AccessNow-Preliminary-Recommendations-On-
Content-Moderation-and-Facebooks-Planned-Oversight-Board.pdf (citing Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, 
The Verge (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00AM) https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-
content-moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona)[hereinafter Access Now (2019)] 
8 Id. at 2 
9 Clare Y. Cho & Jason A. Gallo, Cong. Research Serv., R46662, Social media: Misinformation and Content 
Moderation Issues for Congress 6 (2021)[hereinafter Cho & Gallo (2021)] 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 12; Bloch-Wehba (2020) at 61 
13 Steirnfelt & Lauritzen (2020) at 129-30 (noting that despite Facebook’s claim that its approach to adult nudity 
and sexuality has become more nuanced, Facebook has repeatedly deleted and reinstated photos of ‘Venus from 
Willendorf’) 
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experiences, values etc., thus attempting to moderate “objectionable” content without 
accounting for these underlying issues has, and will continue to silence user speech.  
 While social media platforms have existed for some time, legal and technical 
developments regarding the aforementioned issues are ongoing, thus the existing literature will 
need to be updated in light of those developments and their effects. Existing literature14 on 
content moderation practices mainly focused on region centric laws, factors affecting 
moderation practices, and the ramifications of those practices with respect to various categories 
of content. However, the literature does not effectively assess how content moderation 
developments have led to the excessive removal of ‘objectionable content,’ and how this 
problem might be reined in. That said, these issues are relatively new and have incurred major 
developments like Europe’ Digital Services Acts Package (which has yet to be implemented); 
additionally, there is the Facebook Oversight Board which decided to uphold President 
Trump’s ban from Facebook and Instagram three weeks prior to the writing of this article.15 
The ramifications of these developments have yet to be fully determined, and it is possible that 
the conclusions drawn in this article will lose some of their relevance.  
That said, this article can serve to bridge some of the gaps left by previous studies. The 
focus here will be on the impact that current moderation practices have on harmful, but not 
necessarily illegal content, (i.e. objectionable content) and the value in developing alternative 
practices. This analysis will be grounded in interrelated studies on social media platforms and 
content moderation practices by the most influential and socio-politically relevant platforms, 
especially Facebook. Facebook’s broad reach and controversial reputation throughout the US 
                                                        
14 Statistical data, Case law, Law review articles, Tech blogs, Government research groups, think tanks as well 
as Academic texts and articles. 
15 See generally, Annabelle Gawer, Nick Srnicek, Online Platforms: Economic and Societal Effects, Study 
Commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 656.336 (March 2021) [hereafter Gawer & 
Srnicek (2021)]; Trump Decision – FB Oversight Board. Case Decision 2021-001-FB-FBR [concerns ‘Violence 
and Criminal Behavior’ and ‘Safety’ but not ‘Objectionable Content’] 
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and EU have, and will continue to affect extensive legal and political ramifications.16 This 
article will specifically focus on the US and EU’s approaches to regulating social media 
platforms like Facebook. This is partially due to their similar perspectives on free speech, as 
well as their readily accessible, and extensive amount of data and studies on content 
moderation. Further, though the US and EU have similar perspectives on the right to free 
speech, the EU has demonstrated a greater willingness to relegate free speech in favor of safety 
and economic concerns. This difference, and the subsequent results of that regulation (the 
Digital Services Act [DSA]) sharply contrast with the US’ relatively static approach to content 
moderation. The DSA presented an example of how contemporary, stringent and 
systematically applied regulatory practices are likely to affect major platforms. These 
developments can also be compared against Facebook’s attempt at self-regulation: The 
Oversight Board. The Board is an independent body developed by Facebook to help the 
company regulate its content moderation decisions, especially insofar as objectionable content 
is concerned. By synthesizing these various approaches to content moderation, and assessing 
their strengths and weaknesses, this article will attempt to present alternative solutions to the 
objectionable content problem.  
In Part I(A) Facebook’s [and other platforms’] content moderation methodologies, and 
the economic rationale behind these methods will be explained. This will help explain some of 
the main problems with contemporary content moderation practices. In Part I(B)(a), statistical 
data will be used to highlight Facebook’s reach and usage throughout the US and EU, as well 
as the extent to which users trust Facebook’s moderation practices. Following this, Part I (B)(b) 
will outline how, despite public mistrust, social media companies are nevertheless relied upon 
to keep their platforms safe and clean; however, this reliance, and sometimes over reliance will 
be shown to have its own drawbacks. In Part I(C) the differentiated impacts that the US & EU 
                                                        
16 See infra Part I(A) 
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legal approaches have had on content moderation practices will be analyzed using the existing 
literature. Further, Facebook’s attempt at regulating its moderation practice by establishing an 
independent Board, a Facebook ‘Supreme Court,’ will add to this analysis. However, because 
the Board is so new its true impact on Facebook’s practices is unknown, thus this part of the 
analysis will be comparatively short. That said, the Board has already rendered several 
decisions, and grounded its holdings in a myriad of established laws and rules. Moreover, 
because of the Board’s structure and alleged influence over Facebook, its impact may likely be 
similar to an actual court of law. As the current literature largely precedes the Board’s decisions 
on objectionable content, Part II will contain a synthesized analysis of the previous sections to: 
draw on the implications and conclusions of those sections to add to the existing literature; 
develop a new approach to moderating objectionable content; and highlight how future 
research may advance or even diminish the value of this methodology.   
I. How Social Media Platforms Work, and Why That’s a Problem 
A. The Root of the Problem 
a. Social media platforms utilize a business model that is both a source of 
success and widespread criticism. The core of a social networks’ business 
model, including and perhaps especially Facebook, is the ‘attention 
economy.’ 17 This is the tactic of matching users to the most relevant 
information for them, and monetizing that attention through targeted ads or 
transactions.18 This tactic compliments a concept known as ‘the network 
effect,’ which refers to the understanding that the more users a platform has 
(i.e. the bigger the user network), the more useful it becomes to people who 
                                                        
17 Tambiama Madiega, Digital Services Act, Briefing Commissioned by the Directorate-General for 
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 689.357, 4 (March 2021) [hereinafter Madiega DSA (2021)] 
18 Id. 
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have not already joined the social network.19 Thus, the better the network 
can capture its users’ attention, the more users it can acquire and the greater 
its revenue becomes.20 Revenue streams may vary but are mostly derived 
from online, targeted advertisements.21 Maximizing user engagement, and 
deriving revenue from online ads is the foundation of these platforms’ 
business models, with US social media ad revenues totaling at $35.6 billion 
in 2019.22 Additionally, though time spent on Facebook was expected to 
drop in 2020 to 33 minutes a day among [adult] US users, US advertisers 
were expected to increased their social network spending by 20.4% in 2020, 
and 16.9% in 2021.23 This means that ad revenues for social networks were 
expected to increase from approximately $36 billion in 2019, to $45.53 
billion in 2020 to $50.86 billion in 2021.24 That said, it is the means by 
which social media platforms generate this revenue that the controversy 
becomes apparent – the ‘attention economy.’ Platforms curate, categorize 
and rank content based on the users’ interactions with the site and other 
factors; however, to do this effectively, platforms use non-human, code 
based processes to tailor and predict which content is likely to be relevant  
(algorithms).25 These algorithms allow platforms to sort through massive 
amounts of user generated posts and behaviors (data) to estimate which 
                                                        
19 Arjun Sundararajan, Network Effects,  New York University Stern School of Business (Dec. 23, 2020), 
http://oz.stern.nyu.edu/io/network.html 
20 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 3 
21 Id. at 12 (finding that global online advertising accounted for 98% of Facebook’s annual revenue in 2019) 
22 Interactive Advert. Bureau, Internet Advertising Revenue Report: Full Year 2019 Results & Q1 2020 
Revenues, https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/FY19-IAB-Internet-Ad-Revenue-
Report_Final.pdf (May 2020) (defining social media as ads delivered on platforms including social networking 
and social gaming websites and apps, across all device types, including desktop, laptop, smartphone and tablet) 
23 Debra A. Williamson, US Social Trends for 2020: eMarketer’s Predictions for the Year Ahead, eMarketer, 
https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-social-trends-for-2020 (Jan. 15, 2020) 
24 Id. 
25  Brannon (2019) at 1 (citing Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 Univ. Penn. Law Review 
1445, 1448 (2013)) 
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content (e.g. ads) would be most relevant to each user, and disseminate that 
content accordingly.26 Therefore, more data means more refined algorithms 
which in turn lead to more accurate ads.27 Facebook’s algorithm for example 
can predict a user’s personality with greater accuracy than their own spouse 
by analyzing only 300 ‘likes.’28 One side effect of this is that echo chambers 
tend to develop wherein users become exposed to one kind of content 
instead of a range of voices and opinions.29 Further, since algorithms tend 
to reward visceral and emotive content, this process has exacerbated the 
spread of misinformation, especially since the 2016 US elections [see Part 
I(B)(a) below].30 Although, to keep users engaged and government 
regulators appeased platforms have been using this technology to try to 
prevent the dissemination of such harmful or unlawful online content before 
it is ever seen or distributed.31 The problem however, is that the incentive to 
remove illegal content like the Christchurch shootings has also led to the 
removal of unpopular but not necessarily illegal content (objectionable 
content).32 This incentive has broad ramifications for the entire internet 
speech ecosystem and, as Justice Kennedy noted,  will impact the 
interchange of ideas, and the shaping of public consciousness.33 
 
                                                        
26 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 25 
27 Id.   
28 Social Media Influences our Political Behavior and puts Pressure on our Democracies, New Report Finds, 
EU Science Hub (Oct. 27, 2020) https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/social-media-influences-our-political-
behaviour-and-puts-pressure-our-democracies-new-report-finds 
29 Gawer & Srnicek (2021) at 58 
30 Id. 
31 Bloch-Wehba (2020) at 42-3 
32 Steirnfelt & Lauritzen (2020) at 122-23 (noting that examples of objectionable content include hate speech, 
graphic violence, and nudity or sexual acts) 
33 Keller (2019) at 23  
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B. The Problem 
a. Due to its popularity and business model, Facebook has engendered broad 
albeit divided public scrutiny, especially with regards to how it handles 
user data and moderates content. A majority of US adults use Facebook 
(69%), and the majority of those users (74%) visit the site on a daily 
basis.34 In a 2018 survey, seven of eight Western European countries 
surveyed responded that a third or more of their adult population use social 
media to get their news on a daily basis.35 Further, over 60% of social 
media consumers in all eight countries cited Facebook as the most 
frequently used social media source for news.36 Though only 43% of US 
adults use Facebook as a news source, news results may vary for both EU 
& US users depending on how those users interact with the site.37 These 
variations occur because Facebook’s algorithms curate and present content 
that they predict will have a more likely chance of engaging the user i.e. 
divisive or provocative content.38 Slides presented by an internal Facebook 
team to company executives in 2018 stated, “our algorithms exploit the 
human brain’s attraction to divisiveness,” and warned that the algorithms 
would promote “more and more divisive content in an effort to gain user 
attention and increase time on the platform.”39 Accordingly, US users 
                                                        
34 John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, Pew Research Center (June 1, 2021) 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/ 
35 Amy Mitchell et. al., In Western Europe, Public Attitudes Toward News Media More Divided by Populist 
Views Than Left-Right Ideology, Pew Research Center (May 14, 2018)(polling users in Sweden, Germany, 
France, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, UK & Italy) https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2018/05/14/in-
western-europe-public-attitudes-toward-news-media-more-divided-by-populist-views-than-left-right-ideology/ 
36 Id. 
37 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 25 
38 See supra Part I(a) 
39 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 10-1 (citing Jeff Horowitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Executives Shut Down 
Efforts to Make the Site Less Divisive, Wall Street Journal, (May 26, 2020, 11:38AM) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-executives-nixed-solutions-
11590507499) 
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across the political spectrum largely agree that social media’s effects on 
the US have been mostly negative; however, this belief is particularly 
widespread among Republicans.40 Misgivings among 90% of republicans 
and right leaning independents partially stem from their belief that social 
media platforms are biased against conservatives and engage in political 
censorship.41 This belief is shared among 59% of Democrats and left 
leaning independents, and 73% of US adults.42 This variance is even 
greater with regards to how much each party trusts platforms to label 
content as inaccurate or misleading.43 Similarly, Eurobarometer found that 
of the respondents from the 28 EU member states, only 26% trusted news 
and information accessed on social networks; moreover, Eurostat found 
that only 25% of EU citizens aged between 16 and 74 claimed to have 
provided personal information to social networks.44 Thus, data handling 
and content moderation seem to be the major areas of concern amongst 
European and US social media users.  
b. Nevertheless, despite these concerns, users still rely on companies like 
Facebook and others to keep their platforms clear of objectionable content. 
A sizable majority of US users (66%) say companies have a responsibility 
                                                        
40 Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have a Mostly Negative Effect on the Way Things are 
Going in the US Today, (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americans-
say-social-media-have-a-mostly-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-going-in-the-u-s-today/ (finding that 
53% of Democrats and left leaning independents, and 78% of Republicans and right leaning independents 
believe that social media has a negative impact on the US) 
41 Emily A. Vogels, Andrew Perrin and Monica Anderson, Most Americans Think Social Media Sites Censor 
Political Viewpoints, Pew Research Center (Aug. 2020) https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-
americans-think-social-media-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/#fn-26445-1 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (finding that 73% of Democrats strongly or somewhat approved of this process, whereas 71% of 
Republicans at least somewhat disapproved of this process) 
44 Flash Barometer 464: Fake News and Disinformation Online, Survey Requested by the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content & Technology, Project Number 
2018.2391, at 2 (2018); Social Media: Security Concerns of Sharing Information, Eurostat, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20201013-1(last visited May 27, 2021) 
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to remove objectionable content from their platforms.45 However, nearly 
half (48%) of these users admitted to not being sure about what constitutes 
objectionable content, and even fewer (31%) have a great deal or fair 
amount of confidence in these companies to determine what objectionable 
content should be removed.46 Correspondingly, the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs concluded that 
drawing the line between objectionable and unobjectionable, in good faith, 
is something that goes beyond the law; moreover, it is rooted in the 
plurality and diversity of the users, and providers of the digital 
environment within which the objectionable content manifests.47 Certain 
content is universally objectionable (e.g. videos of animal torture) while 
others may be objectionable to some (e.g. blasphemy), and everything else 
falls somewhere within the spectrum.48 Therefore establishing content 
moderation rules that work with all types of content is problematic. 
Despite this problem, Facebook responded to these concerns by 
developing a continuously developing set of Community Standards 
wherein it divided objectionable content into four parts: (1) Hate Speech; 
(2) Violent and Graphic content; (3) Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity; 
and (4) Sexual Solicitation (the fourth is a new category while ‘Cruel & 
Insensitive’ was subsumed into Hate Speech).49 Though laudable, these 
                                                        
45 John Laloggia, U.S. Public Has Little Confidence in Social Media Companies to Determine Offensive 
Content, Pew Research Center (July 2019) https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/11/u-s-public-has-
little-confidence-in-social-media-companies-to-determine-offensive-content/ 
46 Id. 
47 Giovanni Sartor & Andrea Lorregia, The Impact of Algorithms for Online Content Filtering of Moderation: 
Upload Filters, Study Commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, PE 657.101, at 55 (2020) [hereinafter Sartor & Lorregia (2020)] 
48 See Part I(C) infra 
49 Writing Facebook’s Rulebook, Facebook https://about.fb.com/news/2019/04/insidefeed-community-
standards-development-process/ (last visited May 17, 2021); Objectionable Content in Community Standards, 
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efforts were, and continue to be, hampered by two major issues: (a) the 
nuance of human languages, and (b) over-reliance on content filtering 
technology.50 One early problem that came up were statements which 
“merely cite or parody” the hateful statements of others.51 In response, 
Facebook held that users had to be clear as to their intent otherwise their 
posts would be removed.52 This is a problem when the message is, for 
example, meant to be ironic, and this is especially an issue when taken at  
a global scale.53 Facebook has 3 billion active users as of August 2020 
with the average user spending 50 minutes a day on FB and Instagram; 
additionally, in 2019 it received 76 million appeals to restore posts that 
were taken down, only 23% of which (1.748 million) were restored.54 A 
further 284 million pieces of content were restored without appeal.55 
Facebook has only 15,000 human moderators, thus the sheer volume of 
data it deals with on a daily basis requires some amount of automated 
processes.56 Aside from a lack of human moderators, the increased spread 
of online  misinformation, and illegal content galvanized lawmakers 
around the world to closely scrutinize the content moderation process.57 
Regulators thus imposed certain regulatory strategies e.g. encouraging 
platforms to use content moderation technology to prevent the 
                                                        
Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited May 17, 2021); 
Steirnfelt & Lauritzen (2020) at 122-23 
50 Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s Glawischnig-Piesczek Ruling, 69 
GRUR International 616, 619 (2020) https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikaa047 [hereinafter Keller (2020)] 
51 Steirnfelt & Lauritzen (2020) at 123-24 
52 Id. at 124-25 
53 Id. 
54 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 7; Gawer & Srnicek (2021) at 18 
55 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 7 
56 John Koetsier, Report: Facebook Makes 300,000 Content Moderation Mistakes Every Day, Forbes (June 
2020, 8:08PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/06/09/300000-facebook-content-
moderation-mistakes-daily-report-says/?sh=30c5a70854d0 
57 Bloch-Wehba, (2020) at 42-3 
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dissemination of unlawful online content before it is ever published.58 
Through court rulings and legislation, the EU and US implemented 
different regulatory strategies; however, increased regulatory pressure, 
along with some misguided assumptions about how content filters work 
have led to mixed and, sometimes detrimental ramifications in the internet 
speech ecosystem.59 The tools used to exploit the ‘attention economy’ has 
been a source of success and strife for platforms and their users; however, 
as seen below, government attempts to [partially] co-opt these tools have 
served as a double-edged sword.   
C. Legal background 
a. Despite facing a similar diffusion of illegal and objectionable forms of 
content, the United States and Europe have almost completely diverged in 
their respective regulatory approaches. While the US and EU value similarly 
the consequence of restricting free speech, the EU nevertheless imposes 
specific limitations e.g. on hate speech; moreover, EU member states are 
permitted to restrict certain kinds of speech, including across social media.60 
The impact of this fragmented form of legislation on the European Single 
Market, along with the aforementioned spread of illegal and offensive 
content, has led to major regulatory efforts against platforms like Facebook, 
the full ramifications of which remain to be seen.61 Conversely, the United 
                                                        
58 Id. 
59 Bloch-Wehba (2020) at 72-4 
60 Sartor & Lorregia (2020)(establishing that “public incitement to violence or hatred directed to groups or 
individuals on the basis of certain characteristics, including race, colour, religion, descent and national or ethnic 
origin” constitutes as hate speech with no definition of hate speech in the US); Ruth Levush, Comparative 
Summary, in Limits on Freedom of Expression 1, 3(Law Libr. of Congress, 2019)(noting that Germany and the 
Netherlands specifically recognize limitations on speech that constitutes a denial or praise of atrocities 
committed during the holocaust)[hereinafter Levush (2019)] 
61 Madiega DSA (2021) at 5 
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States’ largely restrained approach to free speech has had relatively less 
impact on platforms;62 however, as seen below, even location specific 
regulations can have a global impact on the way a platform functions.  
b. Under the US legal system, content moderation by private companies 
remains largely in the latter’s hands except with regards to specific kinds of 
illegal content. Attempts at directly regulating social media platforms have 
generally been approached in three ways: (1) The First amendment; (2) 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act [CDA] (47 U.S.C. § 230); 
and (3) the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA].63 However, due to 
the history, particularities and context behind these laws, each law will be 
addressed separately.  
c. First, the majority of internet related First Amendment cases have focused 
on the actions of internet companies rather than their character, thus whether 
or not those companies are social media platforms is irrelevant to the 
analysis.64 With that, attempts at regulating platforms under the First 
Amendment have focused on, and failed to succeed in treating those 
platforms as state actors.65 Nonetheless, insofar as a private actor exercises 
functions that were traditionally and exclusively held by the state, or that 
actor’s actions were so closely regulated by the state such that the former’s 
actions can be fairly treated as that of the state itself, that actor can be subject 
to the First Amendment.66 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner [exclusive powers test], 
                                                        
62 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 22 
63 Keller (2019) at 4; Brannon (2019) Summary 
64 Brannon (2019) at 1 
65 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001)  
66 See id. at 295; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 US 345, 
350-52 (1952) 
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the Supreme Court clarified that claimants arguing that the private actor 
exercised the traditional and exclusive functions of the state must satisfy a 
high threshold i.e. that the actor’s exercise of these powers was such that the 
actor essentially “stood in the shoes of the state.”67 In Packingham v. North 
Carolina [extensive supervision test] the Court held that social media 
platforms can serve as public forums, insofar as they are important places 
for people to speak and listen, and that social media users in particular 
engage in a wide array of protected First amendment activities.68 
Nevertheless, the Court previously held that simply opening a private place 
to the public is, without more, insufficient to entitle the public to First 
Amendment protections.69 Alternatively, the Court noted that the public 
may be granted First Amendment protections if a private company is 
sufficiently under the state’s control; however, this requires extensive state 
regulation, and lower courts have interpreted this as requiring state 
operation or management of the company’s website.70 Thus, whether under 
the exclusive powers, or the extensive supervision test, social media 
platforms have been highly resistant, if not immune to First Amendment 
arguments. Specifically this means that private companies are not required 
to carry user content, and may remove or limit access to that content as they 
see fit. The concern here is that, insofar as it is economically beneficial, 
private intermediaries may not only remove illegal content but unpopular or 
offensive content as well; moreover, this is especially likely when such 
                                                        
67 407 U.S. at 569 
68 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) 
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content is expected to drive other users away.71  
d. Additionally, even if intermediaries were sued on non-constitutional 
grounds, §230 of the CDA provides intermediaries with broad immunity. 
Social media platforms (i.e. intermediaries) like Facebook constitute as 
interactive computer services [ICS], and as such are entitled to: (1) not be 
treated as the publishers or speakers of any information, regardless of the 
nature of that information; and (2) such services may not be held liable for 
voluntarily acting in good faith to remove or restrict access to objectionable 
content on their platforms.72 These protections indicate that intermediaries 
will not only avoid liability for not removing illegal or offensive content 
uploaded by their users, but can freely restrict access to that content if it is 
for non-fraudulent reasons.73 Furthermore, several courts have held that an 
ICS will lose its immunity if it materially contributed to the alleged 
illegality of the content, by being responsible for that illegality through e.g. 
willfully publishing content that the service knows is unlawful.74 
Nevertheless, §230 does not provide complete immunity. For example 
§230(e)(2) allows for suits alleging a violation of intellectual property [IP], 
otherwise the laws pertaining to IP would be limited.75 This leads to the third 
direct approach to regulating content moderation by social media platforms 
in the US; the DMCA.  
                                                        
71 Keller (2019) at 23 
72 47 USC §230(f)(2)(defining interactive computer service as “any information service, system, or software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”); 47 USC §230(c)(1), 
(2); see Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(holding that companies like Facebook 
are interactive computer services) 
73 See Cho & Gallo (2021) at 14, 27 
74 See Fair House Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)); see also Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 413 (6th Cir. 2014) 
75 See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
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e. In contrast with the other approaches, the DMCA imposes strict obligations 
upon platforms; however, these obligations have negatively impacted the 
users. Assuming that a particular platform has fulfilled the safe harbor 
requirements under the DMCA e.g. designating an agent to whom copyright 
owners may send infringement notices, this platform may qualify as a 
hosting service under §512(c).76 Host services are generally immune from 
secondary liability if they: (1) do not know or have reason to know that the 
material posted to websites they host is infringing; (2) are either unable to 
control what their customers post to their sites or gain no direct financial 
benefit from those postings (such as a fee for each item posted); (3) adopt 
and implement a policy for terminating service to repeat infringers, and not 
undercut the effectiveness of standard technological protection measures 
(such as encryption); and (4) crucially, they must comply with the “notice-
and-take-down” provisions under §512(i).77  While this is somewhat similar 
to §230, a major divergence is the 'notice and takedown' provisions. Therein 
lies the issue. Platforms are obligated to take down genuinely unlawful 
material that they are notified of or discover under this provision, but in 
doing so have been criticized for excessively taking down objectionable 
content.78 Particularly due to the DMCA, these takedowns arguably resulted 
from either: (a) an overabundance of caution, as well as to avoid the costs 
of having lawyers assess the legitimacy of the content; or (b) the platforms 
failed to verify users’ claims regarding the content’s illegality.79 Though 
other platforms have tried to sift through such user claims, these efforts are 
                                                        
76 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c), (c)(2) [hereinafter §512(c)]  
77 §512(c)(1)(A)-(C); §512(i); see Bloch-Wehba (2020) at 62 (citing §512(c)(1)(A)) 
78 Keller (2019) at 3; Bloch-Wehba (2020) at 75 
79 Keller (2019) at 3 
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rare.80 With content moderation in general, these takedowns have been 
exacerbated by automated content filters, and in some cases have even left 
unlawful content untouched.81 Adding to this problem are calls by policy 
makers to apply ex ante automation to specific forms of speech; however, 
as previously noted, automated filters are not yet capable of avoiding 
collateral takedowns.82 Furthermore, while the DMCA neither explicitly 
requires platforms to proactively moderate content, nor apply the DMCA’s 
rules extraterritorially, platforms nevertheless tend to opt for global 
takedowns.83 This tendency is partially because it is logistically and 
technically easier for companies like Facebook and Google to have a single 
set of Community Guidelines that are adjusted/expanded in response to 
governmental pressure.84 Moreover, it is easier for their engineers to 
develop content filters that work globally than locally.85 This example of 
local laws with global effects is even more prevalent in Europe where policy 
makers both regionally, and at the state levels have been more willing to 
directly influence moderation practices. 
f. Unlike the US’ relatively stagnant approach to content moderation, the EU 
is currently developing how social media platforms, and other digital service 
providers behave within the EU’s borders.86 The EU’s regard for free speech 
                                                        
80 Id. 
81 Cho & Gallo (2021) at 17; Bloch-Wehba, (2020) at 75 (noting that in a random sample of over 1800 DMCA 
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allegedly infringing work) 
82 Bloch-Wehba (2020) at 75, 82-5; see supra note 7 
83 Id. at 86 
84 Id. 
85 Keller (2019) at 8 
86 Alice Tidey, Ana Lazaro & Jack Parrock, Digital Services Act: Brussels vows to put order into chaos of 
digital world with new tech laws, euronews (Dec. 15, 2020) https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/15/digital-
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is highly similar to the US insofar as e.g. shocking or offensive content is 
concerned, but that regard is not universally applied among EU member 
states.87 Specifically, free speech concerns have sometimes been superseded 
by safety and economic concerns.88 Thus the EU’s approach to regulating 
digital services in general, and content moderation in particular explicitly 
implicates multiple stakeholders and perspectives. Knowing how this 
approach applies to platforms like Facebook, and why a new approach is 
under development requires an understanding of the eCommerce Directive 
[the Directive]. 
g. Since 2000, the EU’s governance of digital services has been approached 
through the Directive with the overall goal of fostering e-commerce 
throughout Europe; however, the Directive’s fragmented application, and 
the lack of adequate content moderation policies triggered calls for a 
supplementary approach – The Digital Services Act Package [the DSA 
Package].89 Despite its shortcomings, several of the Directive’s principles 
remain significant, specifically Articles 14 (Hosting providers) and 15 (no 
general obligation to monitor).90 Article 14 provides that if a company 
storing user data lacks actual or constructive knowledge (i.e. is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent), the company is not liable for that data’s content.91 Hosting 
                                                        
87 Levush (2019) at 4 (noting that the European Court of Human Rights has declared that freedom of speech 
applies to ideas that “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.”) 
88 See Article 19, At a glance: Does the EU Digital Services Act protect freedom of expression?, EDRi (March 
10, 2021) https://edri.org/our-work/does-the-eu-digital-services-act-protect-freedom-of-expression/ [hereinafter 
Article 19 (2021)] 
89 Madiega DSA (2021) at 2-5 
90 Tambiama Madiega, Reform of the EU Liability Regime for Online Intermediaries: Background on the 
Forthcoming Digital Services Act, Study Commissioned by the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research 
Service, PE 649.404, 2-3 (May 2020) [hereinafter Madiega (2020)] 
91 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13 
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providers can retain their immunity if they expeditiously remove or disable 
access to illegal activities or information of which they have actual 
knowledge.92 Although member states cannot mandate that service 
providers actively monitor for illicit content, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union [CJEU] established that states can direct platforms to 
detect and prevent specific types of illegal content under those states’ laws.93  
h. In Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, the plaintiff was 
the former head of the Austrian Green party, and was called a corrupt oaf 
and member of a fascist party on Facebook.94 Facebook disabled access to 
that content in Austria, and a criminal court held that Facebook had to cease 
disseminating equivalent content only if Facebook had knowledge of that 
content; however, an Austrian civil court held that the content was 
‘excessively harmful’ to the plaintiff’s reputation, and held Facebook 
liable.95 Following a referral to the CJEU the Court broadly held that 
injunctions requiring platforms to proactively remove both identical and 
equivalent content are permitted by the Directive.96 Additionally, 
injunctions to block particular content identified by a court are also 
permitted.97 That said, such injunctions could not require the platform to 
independently assess whether specific content violates the law.98 Moreover, 
the CJEU previously differentiated between impermissible general 
monitoring and permissible specific injunctions in L’Oreal SA and Others 
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v. eBay International AG and Others.99 The Court held that online service 
providers cannot be ordered to actively monitor all user data but they can be 
ordered to terminate a particular user’s account or make that user easier to 
identify.100 These rulings and provisions highlight several major, and widely 
supported principles: (1) country of origin principles i.e. providers must 
comply with the laws of a member state to access the EU Single Market; (2) 
the Limited Liability Regime provides that online intermediaries are 
exempt from the content they convey/host  if they fulfill certain conditions 
[safe harbor principle] e.g. hosts must expeditiously remove illegal content 
once they know of it; and (3) member states cannot impose a general 
obligation to monitor information that providers e.g. store for their 
users.101 Still, despite these virtues, the European Commission found large 
variances in the way the Directive was implemented throughout the EU.102 
Specifically, national case law on intermediary liability remains highly 
fragmented due to conflicts between court rulings, and uncertainty 
regarding the application of national norms.103 Furthermore, prior to 2021 
the European Commission generally relied on online platforms to 
voluntarily commit to codes of conduct or practices directly related to 
content moderation practices.104 These practices included e.g. providing 
monthly reports to the European Commission on actions undertaken to 
tackle fake accounts.105 While several major platforms have agreed to these 
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codes of conduct, it has been ineffective with respect to moderating some 
types of objectionable content e.g. misinformation.106 This fragmentation, 
coupled with a lack of clear guidance on how to supervise digital services 
resulted in several issues, namely: users’ increased exposure to illegal and 
harmful content; market dominance by certain platforms; and a divided EU 
Single market.107 In response, the Commission [on the basis of Art. 114 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] put forward the 
Package to “prevent divergences from hampering the free provision of 
cross-border digital services and to guarantee the uniform protection of 
rights and uniform obligations for businesses and consumers across the 
internal market.” Though it is not yet in force the Package’s provisions have 
elicited lively responses from multiple stakeholders, including social media 
platforms.108  
i. In light of these issues the DSA package presents promising albeit 
underdeveloped solutions to the content moderation problem. The package 
is comprised of two pieces of legislation: (a) the eponymous DSA which 
focuses on making a safer digital space in which user rights are protected 
and (b) the Digital Markets Act [DMA] which focuses on curbing the market 
dominance of platforms like Facebook to increase competitiveness, growth 
and development both regionally and abroad.109 The DSA focuses on 
                                                        
106 Id. at 78 
107 Id. at 1; Madiega DSA (2021) at 64 
108 See generally Gawer & Srnicek (2021); Article 19 (2021); Jan Penfrat, The EU’s attempt to regulate Big 
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ensuring platform transparency, and protecting users’ fundamental rights 
through a tiered set of provisions.110 Under the DSA every digital platform 
or service that connects users to goods is obligated to undertake certain 
duties with respect to how they handle user data and illegal content.111 All 
platforms are required to clearly and unambiguously keep users informed 
on how user information is collected, what it is used for, and metadata on 
user targeted ads. 112 Platforms must provide clear-cut notice & takedown 
mechanisms, along with detailed reports on how the user’s content was 
illegal, or how that content violated the platform’s terms and conditions.113 
Additional obligations apply to very large operating platforms (VLOPs) 
with over 45 million users a month, including: clarifying the key 
determinants used by their algorithms to curate and rank content; analyzing 
the systemic risks posed by using the platform, as well as implementing 
effective content moderation mechanisms to mitigate those risks; and 
undergoing annual independent audits, along with employing a dedicated 
compliance officer to ensure the platforms’ compliance under the DSA.114 
Also, unlike similar ventures by the European Commission in the past, the 
Package emphasizes fundamental rights like free speech by retaining 
conditional immunity from liability for hosting providers, and the 
prohibition on general monitoring.115 By preserving the protections 
provided under the Directive, the DSA package can reduce the risk of 
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unnecessary takedowns.116 Users’ speech rights are further protected by 
requiring platforms to participate in, and subsequently report on, out of court 
dispute settlements with users regarding illegal content takedowns.117 That 
said, the DSA and the DMA are not, and should not be understood as distinct 
acts.  
j. Though seemingly separate, the DMA & DSA are complimentary, and  are 
rooted in the concept of user data.118 The DMA focuses on so called 
‘gatekeepers’ such as Facebook or Google or other platforms which satisfy 
a ‘three-limbed test’: (1) they have a significant impact on the European 
internal market; (2) they provide a core platform service which serves as an 
important gateway for business users to reach end users; and (3) they enjoy 
an entrenched position in their operations, or it is foreseeable that they will 
enjoy such a position in the near future.119 Here, 53% of all EU enterprises 
use Facebook, and in the first quarter of 2021 Facebook recorded 423 
million European users per month.120 Adding to this is that Facebook’s 
worldwide social media market share increased from 64% in 2019 to 
roughly 70% in 2020, conversely platforms like Twitter and Tumblr 
remained below 16%.121 Facebook dominates the social media market. As 
previously discussed, platforms like Facebook grew and developed by 
collecting user data to maintain user attention, and thereby implementing 
more narrowly tailored ads; further, their users’ mistrust notwithstanding, 
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these platforms continued to exist and even thrive.122 It is also because of 
this business model, and a lack of regulation (e.g. antitrust laws) that major 
platforms like Facebook have become gatekeepers to their respective 
markets.123 Gatekeepers can restrict competition through e.g. predatory 
pricing or purchasing potential competitors thereby limiting consumers’ 
platform choices.124 This in turn allows firms to impose oppressive contract 
terms against advertisers, and extract greater amounts of user data.125 
Limiting competitor access to user data prevents those competitors from 
delivering that data to advertisers as advertisers are less likely to utilize 
those competitors’ services.126 To mitigate these effects, the DMA regulates 
gatekeeping activities by prohibiting acts like self-referencing; imposing an 
obligation to share collected data with both business users and regular users; 
and even forbidding the reuse of personal data by copying it onto other 
products (e.g. Facebook copying your WhatsApp address book onto 
Facebook’s main platform).127 By understanding the connection between 
user data and market dominance the complimentary nature of the DSA & 
DMA can be established.128 One problem though, is that a holistic 
examination of the DSA package has not been sufficiently emphasized, and 
that this among other shortcomings are likely to undermine the package’s 
                                                        
122 Supra Parts I(A)(a)-(b) 
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efficacy.129 
k. Though the DSA Package emphasizes user rights by improving platform 
transparency and accountability, it is unlikely to sufficiently deter excessive 
takedowns nor rein in the gatekeepers.130 Despite safeguards against 
excessive takedowns such as: Articles 15 (platforms must explain the 
reasoning behind the removal); 14.2(a) (users have to explain why they 
believe the specific content is illegal); and 20.2 (online platforms must adopt 
measures against misuse e.g. users submitting a manifestly ill-founded 
notice regarding some content’s alleged illegality), the DSA Package still 
falls short of the mark.131 Platforms generally have a ‘delete first, ask 
questions later’ mentality, and though some DSA critics applauded these 
new safeguards, other provisions arguably aggravate this mentality. For 
example, once platforms receive “substantiated notice” of some content’s 
illegality, that constitutes actual knowledge for the purpose of host 
immunity under Art. 5.132 Therefore hosting providers gain a strong 
incentive to remove content upon notice. Connected to this is that VLOPs 
[which are not always gatekeepers] are required to annually assess, among 
other things, their content moderation systems for weaknesses or 
shortcomings; however, a logistical and practical flaw here is that a VLOPs’ 
compliance with the DSA Package must be assessed by the European 
Commission [rather than a dedicated independent regulator].133 Efforts to 
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improve content moderation practices are also undercut by the DSA [act]’s 
language which, though only focused on illegal content is still overbroad, 
and despite certain safeguards134 raises the risk of objectionable content 
being unnecessarily removed.135 Finally, despite the DMA’s virtues it does 
not adequately focus on easing barriers to enter the social media market, and 
thereby fails to give [both business and normal] users more choice between 
platforms.136 The provisions and potential outcomes of the DSA Package 
notwithstanding, the actual long term effects and ramifications are currently 
unknown. However, now that platforms face mandatory regulations, they 
have begun to take a more proactive rather than reactive approach to content 
moderation.137 For example, in 2020 the European Commission Vice-
President for Values and Transparency, and Twitter’s CEO sought to 
develop rules which, rather than compel platforms to remove objectionable 
content, instead affect how objectionable content manifests and propagates 
on those platforms.138 At the risk of speculating, this example illustrates how 
aggressive government regulatory practices in conjunction with meaningful 
government-platform collaborations can effectively balance safety concerns 
with users’ right to speak. This argument will be studied further in Part II, 
but as examined below the DSA Package alone is insufficient to mollify 
excessive content moderation. 
l. As social media platforms generally apply their community standards 
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worldwide, regional or even country specific regulations can have a global 
impact. To avoid sudden structural changes, platforms have attempted to 
predict potential government regulations, and preemptively adapt through 
e.g. content filtering; however, this technology is imperfect, and pressure 
from both well-informed and misinformed policy makers has sometimes 
caused unnecessary takedowns or excessive moderation on a global scale.139 
The US & EU have, until the DSA Package, emphasized a ‘notice and 
takedown’ system, and were thus more reactive rather than proactive.140 
Platforms on the other hand have mostly attempted to stay ahead of the 
regulatory curb through a kind of ‘anticipatory obedience,’ by predicting 
new laws, and adjusting their policies accordingly.141 Content filtering 
technology like Facebook’s hash database for violent extremists or 
YouTube’s Content ID system are manifestations of this approach.142 
Unfortunately this technology is still unrefined.143 For example, hashes are 
essentially unique digital fingerprints of specific kinds of content (e.g. 
beheadings conducted by terrorists) which are then collected in a database 
that the platform’s algorithm ‘learns’ from and uses to compare to user 
content that might match the contents of the database.144 However, while 
this process has seen great success in, for example, deleting 99% of ISIS 
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content before it was flagged by users, in late May 2021 Facebook and 
Twitter mistakenly blocked and later restored millions of Palestinian 
accounts and posts related to the recent strife.145 Facebook’s explanation 
was that its hate speech detection software mistakenly classified a key 
hashtag as belonging to a terrorist group.146 A father’s happy birthday wish 
to his son ‘Qassam’ was also likely blocked because Facebook blocks many 
posts about Hamas’ military branch: the al-Qassam Brigades.147 The exact 
capabilities of Facebook’s filtering tools are not known, and that is part of 
the problem.148 Though the DSA Package is an encouraging step, some 
critics underscored the lack of transparency on content filters, specifically 
the need for detailed reports on false positives and negatives.149 
Additionally, despite these problems outside actors such as courts have 
demonstrated some undue optimism here: specifically by assuming that 
platforms are capable of certain kinds of filtering that are actually beyond 
those platforms’ capabilities.150 In the EU, several platforms have even 
warned against including the language ‘not-illegal-but-harmful’ content in 
potential regulations since it forces the platforms to draw the line between 
user safety, and freedom of speech and information.151 Thus to avoid a 
conflict of laws, platforms have urged that they should only be responsible 
for removing illegal content.152 When these companies draw lines, they 
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often do so throughout their platform, and in every country wherein that 
platform is used.153 EU regualtions can therefore impact Facebook’s content 
moderation throughout the world. As discussed in Part I(C)(e) above, it is 
often technically, logistically, and legally easier for companies to filter out 
certain kinds of content everywhere rather than filtering them in a particular 
location. On that note, it is precisely the desire to avoid drawing lines that 
Facebook developed an alternative, and allegedly independent oversight 
solution; The Facebook Oversight Board.154 
m. The Facebook Oversight Board [the Board] is a private appeals system 
focusing solely on Facebook and Instagram’s content moderation decisions, 
specifically to help Facebook understand what content should be kept up, or 
taken down and why.155 The Board is currently composed of 20 (with a 
minimum of 11 and a maximum of 40) multinational, multidisciplinary 
individuals whose authority is provided by a trust agreement which 
explicitly separates the Board from Facebook, and places the former under 
the authority of an Independent trust.156 The Board’s independence was 
enhanced by Facebook’s initial gift of $130 million to the Trust, which used 
it to fund, manage, and develop an LLC that would provide the Board’s 
future source of funding.157 This independence is vital to the Board’s 
                                                        
153 Keller (2019) at 6-8 
154 Kate Cox, Facebook plans launch of its own “Supreme Court” for handling takedown appeals, Ars Technica 
(Sept. 18, 2019, 3:17PM) https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/facebook-plans-launch-of-its-own-
supreme-court-for-handling-takedown-appeals/ [hereinafter Cox (2019)] 
155 Oversight Board Charter Article 1 §4 (2019),  https://about.fb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [hereinafter Oversight Board Charter] 
156 Id. at Article 1 §1; Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to 
Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 Yale L. J. 2418, 2481 (2020) [hereafter Klonick (2020)]; Expertise 
from Around the World, Oversight Board (accessed May 30, 2021) https://oversightboard.com/meet-the-board/ 
(highlighting the diversity of the members, as well as their various areas of expertise e.g. journalism, 
constitutional law, technology regulation and policy design) 
157 Oversight Board Charter, Article 1 §5; Klonick (2020) at 2486;  
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mandate of promoting free expression through principled, independent 
decisions regarding Facebook and Instagram’s (owned by Facebook) 
content moderation decisions.158 Although, this independence is perhaps 
undermined by both the rules that govern the appeals process, and those 
governing the Board’s decision making process.159 First, appealing content 
decisions on Facebook is a five step process requiring users to satisfy several 
pre-requisites, namely that Facebook has to review a user’s case and render 
a final decision; in addition, that decision must include a reference ID that 
can be used to submit an appeal.160 Though this might suggest that Facebook 
controls which cases are subject to the Board’s review, this is undercut by 
the manner in which the Board selects cases. The Board uses its discretion 
to choose cases that are emblematic of major issues in content moderation 
such as censorship of hate speech, female nudity, and covid-19 
misinformation.161 However, while the rules governing the appeals process 
are arguably adequate, the rules governing the decision making process 
present a different issue. The Board’s decisions are derived from several 
sources, and with objectionable content in particular they are: (a) 
Facebook’s Community Standards [specifically under ‘Objectionable 
Content’]; (b) Facebook’s Values (e.g. users’ rights to voice their views); 
and (c) Human Rights Standards (e.g. the International Covenant on 
                                                        
158 Cox (2019)  
159 See Klonick (2020) at 2478, 2488  
160Appealing Content Decisions on Facebook or Instagram, Oversight Board (accessed May 30, 2021) 
https://oversightboard.com/appeals-process/ 
161 Elena DeBré, The Independent Facebook Oversight Board has made its First Rulings, SLATE (Jan. 2021, 
7:23PM) https://slate.com/technology/2021/01/facebook-oversight-boards-content-moderation-rulings.html 
(finding that out of 150,000 cases submitted in December 2020, the Board chose 6); Oversight Board Charter, 
Article 2 §1 (establishing that the Board will select cases “that have the greatest potential to guide future 
decisions and policies”) 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]).162Though the Board 
began accepting cases around October 2020, it has rendered twelve 
decisions as of May 26th 2021; nevertheless, there are few cases pertaining 
to Facebook’s Objectionable Content standards in the US and EU, and most 
of those cases focus on hate speech.163 Facebook defines hate speech as a 
direct attack on people based on protected characteristics like race.164 
Facebook prohibits users from posting content that targets a person or group 
on the basis of such characteristics using “designated dehumanizing” 
generalizations or behavioral statements such as blackface.165 However,  
content shared to condemn or raise awareness about such types of hate 
speech is an exception.166 These exceptions to the Community Standard 
exist to uphold one of Facebook’s core values: Voice i.e. creating a place 
for users to express their diverse views, ideas and information.167 However, 
given the potential for abuse on the internet, these values are balanced 
against considerations like safety (making Facebook a safe, user friendly 
environment) and dignity (mitigating the harassment and degradation of 
others to ensure their dignity).168 Furthermore, given Facebook’s impact on 
human rights, user content is voluntarily assessed under the UN Guiding 
Principles on Human Rights, under which several human rights instruments 
are available.169 Despite the dearth of cases, content moderation is an ever 
                                                        
162 See generally Oversight Board Charter, Article 2 §2  
163 Brian Fung, Facebook’s Oversight Board is Finally Hearing Cases, Two Years after it was First Announced, 
CNN (Oct. 2020, 4:45PM GMT) https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/22/tech/facebook-oversight-board/index.html 
164 See Facebook Community Standards, §3(12)  
165 Id. 
Case Decision 2021-002-FB-UA, Reference ID: FB-S6NRTDAJ, at 8 (Oversight Board, April 13, 2021) 
https://oversightboard.com/decision/FB-S6NRTDAJ/ (hereinafter Zwarte Piet Decision) 
167 Updating the Values that Inform our Community Standards, Facebook (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that-inform-our-community-standards/  
168 Id.; Zwarte Piet Decision at 5-6 
169 Zwarte Piet Decision at 6 (highlighting the ICESCR and its general comments) 
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developing process, and by assessing how the Oversight Board has led this 
issue, insight into a platform-perspective approach can be gained, and 
existing gaps to this process can be filled. 
n. Facebook cannot effectively evaluate whether or not a user’s contribution 
constitutes hate speech without first understanding how its users think, and 
holistically examining the context of that speech. User content constitutes 
hate speech when the factual circumstances, including user intent, are 
assessed through three lenses: (1) Facebook’s Community Standards; (2) 
Facebook’s Values; and (3) International Human Rights law, and is 
subsequently found to be an unprotected form of speech.170 However, unless 
used to condemn or raise awareness about some hate speech, certain forms 
of speech are sufficiently egregious as to raise the risk to people’s safety 
and dignity, and may be removed regardless of user intent or cultural 
values.171 In April 2021, the Board rendered its decision on whether to 
uphold Facebook’s removal of a video of ‘Sinterklaas’ and ‘Zwarte Piet’ 
that were posted for the user’s friends and family.172 In Dutch  Christmas 
tradition, ‘Zwarte Piet’ or ‘Black Pete’ is ‘Sinterklaas’’ (St. Nicholas) 
helper, and is often portrayed in blackface with exaggerated lips, and gold 
earrings.173 Although the user and many Dutch people view Zwarte Piet as 
lacking any racial intent, Facebook has, since August 2020, explicitly 
prohibited caricatures of Black people under its Hate Speech Community 
                                                        
170 Zwarte Piet Decision at 5-8; Case Decision 2021-005-FB-UA, Reference ID: FB-RZL57, at 2, 5-8 (Oversight 
Board, May 20, 2021) https://oversightboard.com/decision/FB-RZL57QHJ/ (hereafter Two Buttons Meme 
Decision) 
171 Zwarte Piet Decision at 11 
172 Id. at 1, 5 
173 Becky Little, This Notorious Christmas Character is Dividing a Country, (Dec. 2018) 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/black-pete-christmas-zwarte-piet-dutch 
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Standards, specifically blackface.174 The Board held that despite the user’s 
innocent intent, blackface is inherently discriminatory under Facebook’s 
Community Standards, regardless of user intent.175 Moreover, even though 
the video was intended for a small number of people, portrayals of Zwarte 
Piet have been inextricably linked to negative and racist stereotypes that can 
harm Black People’s dignity and safety if left unchecked.176 Finally, though 
the right to participate in cultural life, and the freedom of expression 
(including ‘deeply offensive’ expression) are enshrined in international law, 
those rights are not absolute.177 Nevertheless, Facebook properly restricted 
those rights by: (1) clearly and precisely notifying users through information 
videos and newsfeeds, that barring an exception, content featuring blackface 
will be removed (legality); (2) Facebook’s restrictions were legitimate 
because they were aimed at protecting the right to equality and non-
discrimination; and (3) the restrictions were necessary and proportionate to 
those interests because of the harms posed (both physically and 
emotionally) in allowing this type of content to accumulate.178 Facebook’s 
restrictions were thus deemed valid under the Community Standards, 
Facebook’s values, and Facebook’s human rights obligations, and as such 
the Board upheld the removal.179  
o. Conversely, in May, 2021, the Board overturned Facebook’s removal of a 
meme relating to Turkey’s views of the Armenian genocide because that 
                                                        
174 Zwarte Piet Decision at 2 
175 Id. at 10 
176 Id. 11 
177 Id. 12 (citing United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Arts. 2, 
19(3) (23 March 1976) and Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion 
and Expression, CCPR/C/CG/34, ¶¶11-12 (Sept. 12, 2011)) 
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179 Id. at 15-8 
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meme fell under Facebook’s exception for content that condemns or raises 
awareness of hatred.180 The user used the ‘Two Buttons’ meme to point out 
the irony of Turkey’s denial of Armenian genocide, while also claiming that 
the genocide was justified.181 The ‘Two Buttons’ or ‘Daily Struggle’ meme 
is an image of a sweating character attempting to push one of two red 
buttons with contradictory statements.182 Here, the Board applied the same 
standards as the ‘Zwarte Piet’ case; however, to assess the content under the 
Community Standards, the Board addressed the comments on the buttons 
individually before juxtaposing them in the context of the meme.183 The first 
statement, ‘The Armenian Genocide is a lie’ was viewed by Facebook as a 
direct attack on a protected characteristic (ethnicity or national origin), but, 
upon considering the user’s intent, and type of meme used, the Board held 
that the statement was intended to satirize Turkey’s denial.184 The second 
statement: ‘The Armenians were terrorists that deserved it,’ though 
seemingly dehumanizing was quite the opposite.185 When assessing the 
phrases as part of the meme, the majority held that the user clearly intended 
to use satire to raise awareness of, and condemn Turkey’s efforts to deny 
the Armenian Genocide whilst simultaneously vilifying the victims as 
terrorists.186 With regards to Facebook’s values, the Board held that despite 
the Armenians’ struggle during those events, and their efforts to gain 
recognition and justice for those harms, the meme was unlikely to 
                                                        
180 Two Buttons Meme Decision at 1 
181 See Annex 1; Two Buttons Meme Decision at 1, 7 
182 Know Your Meme, Daily Struggle, (updated May 27, 2021) https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/daily-
struggle 
183 Two Buttons Meme Decision at 10 
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185 Id. at 11-2 
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undermine the peoples’ safety and dignity.187 Finally, the Board held that 
given the particularly high value of artistic expressions concerning public 
figures under international law, and Facebook’s misunderstanding of the 
meme, Facebook’s restrictions were invalid under international law.188 
Specifically: (1) Facebook both wrongfully applied an inappropriate 
standard to the meme (the Cruel and Insensitive Community Standard), and 
failed to properly notify the users of the reason for the enforcement; (2) as 
there were no legitimate safety or dignity concerns, Facebook’s restrictions 
lacked a legitimate aim; and (3) the restriction was unnecessary because 
rather than undermine the right of Armenians to equality and non-
discrimination, the meme was intended to do the opposite by condemning 
the Turkish government’s “contradictory and self-serving position.”189 
While not necessarily indicative of how the Board might deal with other 
types of objectionable content, the Board’s method of dealing with Hate 
speech reflects a globalized approach to content moderation. Though the 
Board is obviously required to assess cases using Facebook’s constantly 
updating community standards, that is inevitable given the ever-developing 
definition of what constitutes objectionable content. Further, by assessing 
those standards and values under the rubric of International Human Rights 
law, the Board can avoid a country/region specific analysis, and instead use 
a holistic assessment that can apply to people and cultures worldwide. The 
Board also demonstrated an additional, and vital approach to content 
assessment in the Two Buttons Case - it understood how the meme worked, 
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188 See Two Buttons Meme Decision at 16 
189 Two Buttons Meme Decision at 16 
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and more generally how users think. Different memes have different uses, 
but the way they come about is chaotic and highly context dependent. Here, 
Facebook’s moderators partially missed the intent behind the user’s 
submission, by failing to understand what the Two Buttons meme is used 
for. That said, Facebook only has 15,000 moderators for 3 billion users, and 
attempting to apply the nuanced, contextual approach recommended by the 
board requires a different approach. 
II. Synthesizing a Solution 
A. First, attempting to suggest solutions to a problem before other solutions like the DSA 
Package, and the Oversight Board have properly taken root is premature. That said, 
based on the developments thus far there are several key issues regulators should keep 
in mind going forward. First, the core of the content moderation problem is the 
‘attention economy’ and the complimentary ‘network effect.’ Social media companies 
develop their content filters, and other algorithms in order to acquire as many users as 
possible and retain them. These developments are not simply based on the desire for a 
larger market share, but can also be caused by overly optimistic or even short sighted 
regulations. Additionally, though easing the barriers to entering the social media market 
might improve platform responsibility by incentivizing those platforms to develop safe, 
user friendly platforms, it may exacerbate some issues as well. For example, though 
more platforms means more choices for consumers, platforms may attempt to more 
aggressively retain their consumers by delivering more divisive i.e. more attention 
catching, content. Thus understanding and either mitigating or disincentivizing the 
triggers that push platforms like Facebook to develop these practices is vital to future 
regulatory practices. Second, the EU has, at least for now, demonstrated that aggressive 
regulation gets the platforms to take notice and start suggesting solutions that help the 
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governments while minimizing damage to the platforms’ bottom line. Although there 
is a risk of overcorrection, and even greater takedowns of objectionable content, this 
risk can be reduced in at least four ways: (a) detailed, transparent reports on all aspects 
of a platform’s content moderation practices, especially how often its algorithms mis-
report or fail to report illicit content; (b) annual independent audits by government 
provided auditors to assess how, and to what extent, a platform is developing its content 
moderation practices; (c) focusing on regulating illegal content specifically, and 
requiring platforms to hire more human moderators and independent auditors for the 
sake of objectionable content; (d) clarifying internal laws so that the platforms have an 
easier time knowing what to look for and thereby help mitigate the ‘delete first, ask 
questions later’ mentality. Third, local laws often have global effects and part of the 
problem here is that the laws of more restrictive countries end up applying to less 
restrictive countries. Though indirect, this can affect a large portion of the public 
discourse. The upside though is that the reverse is technically also true; you do not need 
to change the rules everywhere for them to apply everywhere – aggressive but unified 
regulatory measures in a few places can result in widespread changes to content 
moderation practices. This however is a double-edged sword, and risks imposing the 
values of states who can impose regulatory obligations over those that cannot. 
Nevertheless, by understanding how and why platforms work the way they do, 
Governments may be able to impose more nuanced regulations that effectively impact 
the platforms’ bottom line. Moreover, by collaborating with social media platforms, 
Government regulations can be tailored to suit those platforms’ capabilities. This in 
turn could mitigate the ‘delete first, ask questions later’ mentality, and result in more 
careful moderation practices.   
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Conclusion 
In the last several decades, social media platforms have expanded into multinational entities 
affecting every aspect of human life from science and medicine to art and religion, whether 
for good, bad or neither. A core part of this expansion has been people, normal users whose 
reliance on platforms like Facebook or others continues to grow. This reliance partially 
stems from the need to communicate ideas, creations, and developments that range from 
wholesome to vile. On either end of that spectrum the users’ reliance could simply be based 
on the need for attention. User mentality however is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
recent conflagration of misinformation, bullying, harassment, hateful messages and overall 
negative albeit not necessarily illegal content, has accompanied the growth of social media. 
However, as most users and as such, their governments, prefer reasonably safe and 
comfortable forums within which to express themselves, platforms have either on their own 
initiative or from government pressure, attempted to establish those forums. Algorithmic 
efforts like Facebook’s terrorism hash databases have both succeeded and failed to 
moderate negative content, whether illicit or objectionable, and has resulted in widespread 
harm to those users’ abilities to freely express themselves. This failure is partially due to 
the scale at which such platforms operate, overzealous yet shortsighted regulatory efforts, 
and in cases where regulation is relatively lacking (e.g. the US) the failure can be caused 
by a platform’s excessive desire to retain users. Though some of these efforts are 
economically efficient, they have resulted in an overdependence on computer based 
moderation that is not yet capable of dissecting the nuances of human language and intent. 
That said, and to their credit, some platforms like Facebook have recognized this problem, 
and the broader issue of differentiating between illegal content and offensive content which 
[though uncomfortable] should nevertheless be allowed rather than shut out. This is 
especially so when the content itself has been mischaracterized by those algorithms. This 
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realization however, and the subsequently developed Facebook Oversight Board, as well 
as the EU’s DSA Package are encouraging for the future of content moderation. 
Nevertheless, both developments are either too new or not yet in force, thus long term 
studies of where these developments lead will likely be necessary. Further, even though the 
Oversight Board has delivered some promising holdings, it is still too soon to say how that 
will affect Facebook’s moderation practices in the long run. For example, future researchers 
can analyze multiple Oversight Board cases on specific topics over several years to see how 
much, and the way in which the Board attaches weight to different sources like Facebook’s 
community standards, human rights standards, Facebook values etc. Adding to this, I would 
argue that a language analysis of different community standards/terms and conditions 
across different platforms should be analyzed for similarities, gaps, whether the gaps are 
similar, and whether the differences are all that different. These recommendations, along 
with those previously discussed must be considered alongside developments in the DSA 
Package and the Oversight Board in order to protect not just user speech but user safety as 
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